Essayes.

Religious Meditations.

Places of perswasion and disswasion.

Seene and allowed.

AT LONDON,
Printed for Humfrey Hooper
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8° 2.67.

Essaies.

1. *Of studie.*
2. *Of discourse.*
3. *Of Ceremonies and respects.*
4. *Of followers and friends.*
5. *Of Sutors.*
6. *Of expence.*
7. *Of Regiment of health.*
8. *Of Honour and reputation.*
9. *Of Faction.*
10. *Of Negociating.*

To M. Anthony

Bacon his deare

Brother.

LOuing, and beloued Brother, I doe now like ſome that haue an Orcharde ill neighbored, that gather their fruite before it is ripe, to preuent ſtealing. Theſe fragments of my conceites were going to print; To labour the ſtaie of them had bin

troubleſome, and ſubiect to interpretation; to let them paſſe had beene to aduenture the wrong they mought receyue by vntrue Coppies, or by ſome garniſhment, whiche it mought pleaſe any that ſhould ſet them forth to beſtow vpō them. Therefore I helde it beſt diſcreation to publiſh them my ſelfe as they paſſed long agoe from my pen, without any further diſgrace, then the weakeneſſe of the Author. And as I did euer hold, there mought be as great a vanitie in retiring and withdrawing mens conceites (except they be

of

of ſome nature) from the world, as in obtruding them: So in theſe particulars I haue played my ſelfe the Inquiſitor, and find nothing to my vnderſtanding in them contrarie or infectious to the ſtate of Religion, or manners, but rather (as I ſuppoſe) medicinable. Only I diſliked now to put them out becauſe they will bee like the late new halfepence, which though the Siluer were good, yet the peeces were ſmall. But ſince they would not ſtay with their Maiſter, but would needes trauaile abroade, I haue preferred

them to you that are next my ſelf, Dedicating them, ſuch as they are, to our loue, in the depth whereof (I aſſure you) I ſometimes wiſh your infirmities tranſlated vppon my ſelfe, that her Maieſtie mought haue the ſeruice of ſo actiue and able a minde, and I mought bee with excuſe confined to theſe contemplations and Studies for which I am fitteſt, ſo commend I you to the preſeruation of the diuine Maieſtie. From my Chamber at Graies Inne, this 30. of Ianuarie. 1597.

Your entire louing brother,

Fran. Bacon.

ESSAIES.

Of Studies.

STudies ſerue for paſtimes, for ornamentes and for abilities. Their chiefe vſe for paſtime is in priuatenes and retiring; for ornament is in diſcourſe, and for abilitie is in iudgement. For expert men can execute, but learned men are fitteſt to iudge or cenſure.

¶ To ſpende too much time in them is ſloth, to vſe them

them too much for ornament is affectation: to make iudgement wholly by their rules, is the humour of a Scholler. ¶ They perfect *Nature*, and are perfected by experience. ¶ Craftie men contemne them, simple men admire them, and wise men vse them: For they teach not their own vse, but that is a wisedome without them: and aboue them won by obseruation. ¶ Reade not to contradict, nor to beleeue, but to waigh and consider. ¶ Some bookes are to be tasted, others to bee swallowed, and some fewe to be chewed and disgested. That is, some bookes are to be readeonely in partes; o-

thers

thers to be read but curſorily, and ſome few to be read wholly & with diligence & attention. ¶ Reading maketh a full man, conference a ready man, and writing an exact man. And therefore if a man write little, he had need haue a great memory: if he confer little, haue a preſent wit, & if he read little, he had need haue much cunning, to ſeem to know that he doth not. ¶ Hiſtories make men wiſe, Poets witty: the Mathematicks ſubtile, natural Philoſophie deep: Moral graue, Logicke and Rhetorike able to contend.

Of

Of Discourse.

Ome in their discourse desire rather commendation of wit in being able to hold all arguments, then of iudgement in discerning what is true, as if it were a praise to know what might be said, and not what should be thought. Some haue certaine Common places and Theames wherein they are good, & want variety, which kind of pouertie is for the most part tedious, and now and then ridiculous. The honourablest part of talke is

to

to giue the occaſion, and againe to moderate and paſſe to ſomewhat els. ¶ It is good to vary & mixe ſpeech of the preſent occaſion with argument, tales with reaſons, asking of queſtions, with telling of opinions, & ieſt with earneſt. ¶ But ſome things are priuiledged from ieſt, namely Religion, matters of ſtate, great perſons, any mans preſente buſineſſe of importance, and any caſe that deſerueth pittie. ¶ He that queſtioneth much ſhall learne much, and content much, ſpecially if hee apply his queſtions to the ſkil of the perſon of whome hee asketh, for he ſhall giue the occaſion to pleaſe themſelues

ſelues in ſpeaking, and himſelfe ſhal continually gather knowledge. ¶ If you diſſemble ſometimes your knowledge of that you are thought to knowe, you ſhall be thought another time to knowe that you knowe not. ¶ Speech of a mans ſelfe is not good often, and there is but one caſe, wherein a man may commend himſelf with good grace, and that is in commending vertue in another, eſpecially if it bee ſuch a vertue, as whereunto himſelfe pretendeth. ¶ Diſcretion of ſpeech is more then eloquence, & to ſpeak agreably to him, with whom we deale is more then to ſpeake in good wordes or in

good

good order. ¶ A good continued speech without a good speech of interlocution sheweth slownes: and a good reply or secōd speech without a good set speech sheweth shallownesse and weakenes, as we see in beasts that those that are weakest in the course are yet nimblest in the turne. ¶ To vse too many circumstances ere one come to the matter is wearisome, to vse none at al is blunt.

Of Ceremonies and Respects.

HE that is onely reall had needs haue exceeding great partes of vertue

vertue, as the ſtone had need bee rich that is ſet without foyle. ¶ But commonly it is in praiſe as it is in gaine. For as the prouerbe is true *That light gaines make heauie Purſes:* Becauſe they come thicke, whereas great come but now and then, ſo it is as true that ſmall matters win great commendation: becauſe they are continually in vſe and in note, whereas the occaſion of any great vertue commeth but on holy daies. ¶ To attaine good formes, it ſufficeth not to diſpiſe them, for ſo ſhall a man obſerue them in others and let him truſt himſelfe with the reſt, for if hee care to expreſſe thē he ſhal leeſe their

their grace, which is to bee naturall and vnaffected. Som mens behauiour is like a verſe wherein euery ſillable is meaſured. How can a man comprehend great matters that breaketh his mind too much to ſmall obſeruations? ¶ Not to vſe Ceremonies at all, is to teach others not to vſe them again, & ſo diminiſh his reſpect, eſpecially they be not to be omitted to ſtrãgers & ſtrange natures. ¶ Amongſt a mans pieres a mã ſhalbe ſure of familiaritie, & therefore it is a good title to keep ſtate: amongſt a mans inferiors one ſhalbe ſure of reuerẽce, and therfore it is good a little to bee familiar. ¶ Hee that is too much in anye

thing,

thing, so that hee giue an other occasion of satietie, maketh himselfe cheape. ¶ To apply ones selfe to others is good, so it bee with demonstration that a man doth it vpon regarde, and not vpon facilitie. ¶ It is a good precept generally in seconding another: yet to adde somewhat of ones owne, as if you will graunt his opinion, let it bee with some distinction, if you will follow his motion, let it bee with condition: if you allow his counsell, let it be with alleadging further reason.

Of

Of followers & friends.

Costly followers are not to bee liked, least while a man maketh his traine longer, he make his winges shorter: I reckon to bee costlie not them alone which charge the purse, but which are wearisome and importune in sutes. Ordinary following ought to challenge no higher conditions then countenaunce, recommendation and protection from wrong.

¶ Factious followers are worse

worſe to be liked, which follow not vpon affection to him with whome they raunge themſelues, but vpon diſcontentment conceiued againſt ſome other, whereuppon commonly inſueth that ill intelligence that we many times ſee betweene great perſonages. ¶ The following by certaine States anſwerable to that which a great perſon himſelfe profeſſeth, as of Souldiers to him that hath been imployed in the warres, and the like hath euer been a thing ciuile, and well taken euen in Monarchies, ſo it be without too much pompe or popularitie. ¶ But the moſt honorable kind of following

is

is to be followed, as one that apprehendeth to aduance vertue and desert in all sorts of persons, and yet where there is no eminent ods in sufficiencie, it is better to take with the more passable, then with the more able. In gouernment it is good to vse men of one rancke equally, for, to countenance some extraordinarily, is to make them insolent, and the rest discontent, because they may claime a due. But in fauours to vse men with much differēce & election is good, for it maketh the persons preferred more thankefull, and the rest more officious, because all is of fauour. ¶ It is good not to make

too

too much of any man at first, because one cannot holde out that proportion. ¶ To be gouerned by one is not good, and to be distracted with many is worse; but to take aduise of friends is euer honorable: *For lookers on many times see more then gamesters; and the vale best discouereth the hill.* ¶ There is little friendship in the world, and least of all betweene equals, which was wont to be magnified. That that is, is betweene superiour and inferiour, whose fortunes may comprehend the one the other.

Of Sutors.

Many ill matters are vndertaken, and many good matters with ill minds. Some embrace Sutes which neuer meane to deale effectually in them. But if they see there may bee life in the matter by some other meane, they will be content to winne a thanke, or take a second reward. Some take holde of Sutes onely for an occasion to crosse some other, or to make an information, whereof they could not otherwise haue an apt pretext, without care what become of the Sute, when that

that turne is ſerued. Nay, ſome vndertake Sutes with a full purpoſe to let them fall, to the ende to gratifie the aduerſe partie or competitor. ¶ Surely there is in ſort a right in euery Sute, either a right of equitie, if it be a Sute of controuerſie; or a right of deſert, if it be a Sute of petition. If affection leade a man to fauour the wrong ſide in iuſtice, let him rather vſe his countenance to compounde the matter then to carrie it. If affection leade a man to fauour the leſſe worthie in deſert, let him do it, without deprauing or diſabling the better deſeruer. ¶ In Sutes a man doth not well vnderſtand, it is good to re-

ferre

ſerre them to ſome friend of truſt and iudgement, that may report whether he may deale in them with honor. ¶ Sutors are ſo diſtaſted with delayes and abuſes, that plaine dealing in denying to deale in Sutes at firſt, and reporting the ſucceſſe barely, and in challenging no more thankes then one hath deſerued, is growen not only honorable but alſo gracious. ¶ In Sutes of fauour the firſt comming ought to take little place, ſo farreforth conſideration may be had of his truſt, that if intelligẽce of the matter could not otherwiſe haue beene had but by him, aduantage be not taken of the note. ¶ To be ignorãt of the value of

of a Sute is ſimplicitie, as well as to be ignorant of the right thereof is want of conſcience. ¶ Secrecie in Sutes is a great meane of obtayning, for voicing them to be in forwardnes may diſcourage ſome kinde of Sutors, but doth quicken and awake others. ¶ But tyming of the Sutes is the principall, tyming I ſay not onely in reſpect of the perſon that ſhould graunt it, but in reſpect of thoſe which are like to croſſe it. ¶ Nothing is thought ſo eaſie a requeſt to a great perſon as his letter, and yet if it be not in a good cauſe, it is ſo much out of his reputation.

Of

Of Expence.

RIches are for ſpending, and ſpending for honour & good actions. Therefore extraordinarye Expence, muſt bee limited by the worth of the occaſion; for voluntarie vndoing may be as well for a mans countrie, as for the kingdome of heauen. But ordinarie expence ought to bee limited by a mans eſtate, and gouerned with ſuch regard, as it be within his compaſſe, and not ſubiect to deceite and abuſe of ſeruants, and ordered to the beſt ſhew, that the Bils may be leſſe then the

eſtimation abroade. ¶ It is no baſenes for the greateſt to deſcend and looke into their owne eſtate. Some forbeare it not vpō negligence alone, but doubting to bring themſelues into melancholy in reſpect they ſhall finde it broken. But *Woundes cannot be cured without ſearching.* ¶ He that cannot looke into his owne eſtate, had neede both chooſe well thoſe whome he imployeth, yea and change them often. For new are more timerous and leſſe ſubtle. ¶ In clearing of a mans eſtate, he may as well hurt himſelfe in being too ſuddaine, as in letting it run on too long, for haſtie ſelling is cōmonly as diſad-

uan-

uantageable as intereſt. ¶ He that hath a ſtate to repaire may not deſpiſe ſmall things; and commonly it is leſſe diſhonourable to abridge pettie charges, then to ſtoupe to pettie gettings. ¶ A man ought warily to begin charges, which once begun, muſt continue. But in matters that returne not, he may be more magnificēt.

Of Regiment of health.

THere is a wiſdome in this beyond the rules of Phiſicke. A mans owne obſeruation what hee findes good of, and what hee

findes hurt of, is the best Physick to preserue health. But it is a safer conclusion to say, This agreeth not well with me, therefore I will not continue it then this, I finde no offence, of this therefore I may vse it. For strength of nature in youth palleth ouer many excesses, which are owing a man till his age. ¶ Discerne of the comming on of yeares, and thinke not to do the same things still. ¶ Beware of any suddaine change in any great point of diet, and if necessitie inforce it, fit the rest to it. ¶ To be free minded, & chearefully disposed at houres of meate, and of sleepe, and of exercise, is the best precept of long

long lasting. ¶ If you flie Physicke in health altogether, it will be too strange to your body, when you shall neede it: If you make it too familiar, it will worke no extraordinarie effect when sickenesse commeth. ¶ Despise no new accident in the bodie, but aske opinion of it. ¶ In sickenesse respect health principally, and in health action. For those that put their bodies to indure in health, may in most sicknesses which are not very sharp, be cured only with diet and tending. ¶ Physitians are some of them to pleasing and conformable to the humours of the patient, as they presse not the true cure of

the diſeaſe; and ſome other are ſo regular in proceeding according to Arte for the diſeaſe, as they reſpect not ſufficiently the condition of the patient. Take one of a middle temper, or if it may not be found in one man, compounde two of both ſorts, and forget not to call as well the beſt aquainted with your body, as the beſt reputed of for his facultie.

Of Honour and reputation.

THe winning of Honour is but the reuealing of a mans vertue & worth without diſaduantage, for ſome in their actions

ons doe affect Honour and reputation, which ſort of men are commonly much talked of, but inwardly little admired: and ſome darken their vertue in the ſhew of it, ſo as they be vnder-valewed in opinion. ¶ If a man performe that which hath not beene attempted before, or attempted and giuen ouer, or hath been atchieued, but not with ſo good circumſtance, he ſhall purchaſe more honour, then by effecting a matter of greater difficultie or vertue, wherein he is but a follower. ¶ If a man ſo temper his actions as in ſome one of thē he do content euerie faction or combination of people,

the Muſicke will bee the fuller. ¶ A man is an ill husband of his Honour that entereth into any action, the failing wherein may diſgrace him more, then the carrying of it through can Honour him. ¶ Diſcreete followers helpe much to reputation. ¶ Enuie which is the canker of Honour, is beſt extinguiſhed by declaring a mans ſelfe in his ends, rather to ſeeke merite then fame, and by attributing a mans ſucceſſes rather to diuine prouidence and felicitie, then to his vertue or pollicie.

¶ The true Marſhalling of the degrees of ſouereigne Honour are theſe. In the

firſt

first place are *Conditores*, founders of States. In the second place are *Legislatores*, Lawgiuers, which are also called second founders, or *Perpetui principes*, because they gouerne by their ordinances after they are gone. In the third place are *Liberatores*, such as compound the long miseries of ciuill warres, or deliuer their Countries from seruitude of strangers or tyrants. In the fourth place are *Propagatores*, or *Propugnatores imperii*, such as in honourable wars enlarge their territories, or make noble defence against Inuaders. And in the last place are *Patres patriæ*, which raigne iustly, and make the

times good wherein they liue. Degrees of honour in ſubiects are firſt *Participes curarum*, thoſe vpon whome Princes doe diſcharge the greateſt waight of their affaires, their *Right hands* (as we call them.) The next are *Duces belli*, great leaders, ſuch as are Princes Lieutenants, and do them notable ſeruices in the warres. The third are *Gratioſi*, fauorites, ſuch as exceede not this ſcantling to be ſollace to the Soueraigne, and harmeleſſe to the people. And the fourth *Negotiis pares*, ſuch as haue great place vnder Princes, and execute their places with ſufficiencie.

Of

Of Faction.

MAnie haue a new wiſedome indeed, a fonde opinon; That for a Prince to gouerne his eſtate, or for a great perſon to gouerne his proceedings according to the reſpects of Factions, is the principall part of pollicie. Whereas contrariwiſe, the chiefeſt wiſedome is either in ordering thoſe things which are generall, & where in men of ſeuerall Factions doe neuertheleſſe agree, or indealing with correſpondence to particular perſons one by one, But I ſay not that the conſideration of

Factions

Factions is to be neglected.

¶ Meane men muſt adheare, but great men that haue ſtrength in themſelues were better to maintaine themſelues indifferent and neutrall; yet euen in beginners to adheare ſo moderately, as he be a man of the one Faction, which is paſſableſt with the other, commonly giueth beſt way.

¶ The lower and weaker Faction is the firmer in coniunction. ¶ When one of the factions is extinguiſhed, the remaining ſubdiuideth, which is good for a ſecond. It is commonly ſeene, that men once placed, take in with the contrarie faction to that by which they enter.

¶ The

¶ The Traitor in factions lightly goeth away with it, for when matters haue ſtuck long in ballancing, the winning of ſome one man caſteth them, and he getteth all the thankes.

Of Negociating.

IT is generally better to deale by ſpeech then by letter, and by the meditation of a thirde then by a mans ſelfe. Letters are good when a man would draw an aunſwere by letter back againe, or when it may ſerue for a mans iuſtification afterwardes to produce his owne letter. To deale in perſon

perſon is good when a mans face breedes regard, as commonly with inferiours. ¶ In choyce of inſtruments it is better to chooſe men of a plainer ſorte that are like to do that that is committed to them, and to reporte backe again faithfully the ſucceſſe, then thoſe that are cunning to contriue out of other mens buſineſſe ſomewhat to grace themſelues, and will helpe the matter in reporte for ſatisfactions ſake.

¶ It is better to ſounde a perſon with whom one deals a far off, then to fal vpon the pointe at firſt, except yor mean to ſurpriſe him by ſom ſhort queſtion. ¶ It is better dealing with men in appetite

petite then with thoſe which are where they would be. ¶ If a man deale with an other vpon conditions, the ſtart or firſt performance is all, which a man can not reaſonablie demand, except either the nature of the thing be ſuch which muſt go before, or els a man can perſwade the other partie that hee ſhall ſtill neede him in ſome other thing, or els that he bee counted the honeſter man. ¶ All practiſe is to diſcouer or to worke: men diſcouer themſelues in truſt, in paſſion, at vnwares, and of neceſſitie, when they would haue ſomewhat done, and can not finde an apte pretext. If you woulde worke

worke any man, you muſt eyther know his nature, and faſhions and ſo lead him, or his ends, and ſo winne him, or his weakenes or diſaduantages, & ſo awe him, or thoſe that haue intereſt in him and ſo gouerne him. ¶ In dealing with cunning perſons, we muſt euen conſider their ends to interpret their ſpeeches, and it is good to ſay little to them, & that which they leaſt looke for.

FINIS.

MEDITA-
TIONES
Sacræ.

LONDINI.
Excusum impensis Humfridi Hooper. 1597.

1 De operibus Dei, & hominis.
2 De miraculis Seruatoris.
3 De columbina innocentia, & serpentina prudentia.
4 De exaltatione Charitatis.
5 De mensura curarum.
6 De Spe terrestri.
7 De Hypocritis.
8 De Impostoribus.
9 De generibus impostura.
10 De Atheismo.
11 De Hæresibus.
12 De Ecclesia, & Scripturis.

MEDITATIONES SACRÆ.

De operibus Dei & hominis.

VIdit Deus omnia quæ fecerant manus eius, & erant bona nimis: homo autem conuersus, vt videret opera quæ fecerunt manus eius, inuenit quòd omnia erant vanitas, et vexatio ſpiritus.

Quare si opera Dei operaberis, sudor tuus vt vnguentum aromatum, et feriatio tua vt Sabathum Dei. Laborabis in sudore bonæ conscientiæ, & feriabere in otio suauissimæ contemplationis. Si autem post magnalia hominum persequêris, erit tibi in operando stimulus & angustia, & in recordando fastidiu, et exprobratio. Et meritó tibi euenit (ô homo) vt cùm tù qui es opus Dei, non retribuas ei beneplacentiam; etiam opera tua reddant tibi fructum similem amaritudinis.

De

De Miraculis Seruatoris.

Bene omnia fecit.

Erus plauſus, Deus cum vniuerſa crearet, vidit quód ſingula, & omnia erant bona nimis. Deus verbum in miraculis quæ edidit (omne autem miraculum eſt noua creatio, & non ex lege primæ creationis) nil facere voluit, quod non gratiam, & beneficentiam omninó ſpiraret. Moſes edidit miracula, & profligauit Ægiptios peſtibus

ſtibus multis, Elias edidit, et occluſit cælum ne plueret ſuper terram; et rurſus eduxit de cælo ignem Dei ſuper duces, & cohortes, Elizeus edidit, & euocauit vrſus è deſerto quæ laniarent impuberes; Petrus Ananiam ſacrilegum hypocritam morte; Paulus Elimam magum cæcitate percuſsit: Sed nihil huiuſmodi fecit Ieſus. Deſcendit ſuper eum ſpiritus in forma columbæ, de quo dixit, Neſcitis cuius ſpiritus ſitis, *ſpiritus Ieſu, ſpiritus columbinus, fuerunt illi ſerui Dei, tanquam boues Dei triturantes granum, & conculcantes paleam:*

am: ſed Ieſus Agnus Dei ſine ira, & iudicijs. Omnia eius miracula circa corpus humanum; et doctrina eius circa animam humanam. Indiget corpus hominis alimento, defenſione ab externis, & curâ. Ille multitudinem piſcium in retibus congregauit, vt vberiorem victum hominibus preberet, ille alimentum aquæ in dignius alimentum vini ad exhilarandum cor hominis conuertit. Ille ficum, quòd officio ſuo ad quod deſtinatum fuit, ad cibum hominis videlicet non fungeretur, areſieri iuſsit.

Ille

Ille penuriam piſcium, et panum ad alendum exercituum populi dilatauit: Ille ventos quod nauigãtibus minarẽtur corripuit: Ille claudis motum, cæcis lumen, mutis ſermonem, languidis ſanitatem, leproſis carnem mundam, demoniacis animum integrum, mortuis vitam reſtituit. Nullum miraculum iudicij, omnia beneficentiæ, et circa corpus humanum, nam circa diuitias non eſt dignatus edere miracula; niſi hoc vnicum, vt tributum daretur Cæſari.

De Columbina innocentia, et Serpentina prudentia.

Non accipit ſtultus verba prudentiæ, niſi ea dixeris quæ verſantur in corde eius.

IVdicio hominis deprauato & corrupto, omnis quæ adhibetur eruditio & perſuaſio irrita eſt, et deſpectui quæ non ducit exordium a detectione, et repreſentatione malæ complexionis animi ſanandi, quemadmo-

dum inutiliter adhibetur medicina non pertentato vulnere. Nam homines malitiosi, qui nihil sani cogitant, præoccupant hoc sibi, vt putent bonitatem ex simplicitate morum, ac inscitia quadam, & imperitia rerum humanarum gigni. Quare nisi perspexerint ea quæ versantur in corde suo, id est, penitissimas latebras malitiæ suæ perlustratas esse, ei qui suasum molitur, de ridiculo habent verba prudentiæ; Itaque ei qui ad bonitatem aspirat, non solitariam, & particularem, sed seminalem, & genitiuam quæ alios trahat, debent esse

esse omninò nota, quæ ille vocat Profunda Satanæ; *vt loquatur cum auctoritate & insinuatione vera: Hinc est illud*, Omnia probate, quod bonum est tenete. *Inducens electionem iudiciosam ex generali examinatione: Ex eodem fonte est illud;* Estote prudentes sicut serpentes, innocentes sicut columbæ. *Non est deus serpentis, nec venenum, nec aculeus, quæ non probata debeant esse, nec pollutionẽ quis timeat, nam & sol ingreditur latrinas, nec inquinatur, nec quis se deum tentare credat, nam ex præcepto est,*

Ille penuriam piſcium, et panum ad alendum exercitum populi dilatauit: Ille ventos quod nauigãtibus minarẽtur corripuit: Ille claudis motum, cæcis lumen, mutis ſermonem, languidis ſanitatem, leproſis carnem mundam, demoniacis animum integrum, mortuis vitam reſtituit. Nullum miraculum iudicij, omnia beneficentiæ, et circa corpus humanum, nam circa diuitias non eſt dignatus edere miracula; niſi hoc vnicum, vt tributum daretur Cæſari.

De

De Columbina innocentia, et Serpentina prudentia.

Non accipit ſtultus verba prudentiæ, niſi ea dixeris quæ verſantur in corde eius.

IVdicio hominis deprauato & corrupto, omnis quæ adhibetur eruditio & perſuaſio irrita eſt, et deſpectui quæ non ducit exordium a detectione, et repreſentatione malæ complexionis animi ſanandi, quemadmo-

dum inutiliter adhibetur medicina non pertentato vulnere. Nam homines malitiosi, qui nihil sani cogitant, præoccupant hoc sibi, vt putent bonitatem ex simplicitate morum, ac inscitia quadam, & imperitia rerum humanarum gigni. Quare nisi perspexerint ea quæ versantur in corde suo, id est, penitissimas latebras malitiæ suæ perlustratas esse, ei qui suasum molitur, de ridiculo habent verba prudentiæ; Itaque ei qui ad bonitatem aspirat, non solitariam, & particularem, sed seminalem, & genitiuam quæ alios trahat, debent esse

esse omninò nota, quæ ille vocat Profunda Satanæ; *ut loquatur cum auctoritate & insinuatione vera: Hinc est illud*, Omnia probate, quod bonum est tenete. *Inducens electionem iudiciosam ex generali examinatione: Ex eodem fonte est illud*; Estote prudentes sicut serpentes, innocentes sicut columbæ. *Non est deus serpentis, nec venenum, nec aculeus, quæ non probata debeant esse, nec pollutionẽ quis timeat, nam & sol ingreditur latrinas, nec inquinatur, nec quis se deum tentare credat, nam ex præcepto est,*

Et ſufficiens eſt Deus vt vos immaculatos cuſtodiat.

De exaltatione Charitatis.

Si gauiſus ſum ad ruinam eius qui oderat me, & exaltaui quod inueniſſet eum malum.

Deteſtatio Iob, amicos redamare, eſt charitas Publicanorum ex fœdere vtilitatis, verſus inimicos autem bene animatos eſſe, eſt ex apicibus iuris chriſtiani, et imitatio diuinitatis.

tatis. Rursus tamen huius charitatis complures sunt gradus, quorum primus est inimicis resipiscentibus ignoscere, ac huius quidem charitatis etiam apud generosas feras vmbra quædam, & imago reperitur, nam & leones in se submittentes, & prosternentes non vlteriùs sæuire perhibentur. Secundus gradus est inimicis ignoscere, licet sint duriores, & absq; reconciliationum piaculis. Tertius gradus est non tantũ veniã, et gratiam inimicis largiri, sed etiam merita, & beneficia in eos conferre. Sed habent hi gradus, aut habere pos-

sunt, nescio quid potius ex ostentatione, aut saltem animi magnitudine quàm ex charitate pura. Nam cum quis virtutem ex se emanare, & affluere sentit, fieri potest vt is efferatur, & potiùs virtutis suæ fructu quam salute, et bono proximi delectetur. Sed si aliunde malum aliquod inimicum tuum deprehendat, et tu in interioribus cellulis cordis graueris, et angustieris, nec, quasi dies vltionis, et vindictæ tuæ aduenisset, lætaris, hoc ego fastigium, et exaltationem charitatis esse pono.

De mensura curarum.

Sufficit diei malitia sua.

Modus esse in curis humanis debet, alioqui & inutiles sunt, vt quæ animum opprimant, & iudicium confundant; & prophanæ, vt quæ sapiant animum; qui perpetuitatem quãdam in rebus mundanis sibi spondeat. Hodierni enim debemus esse ob breuitatem æui, & non crastini, sed vt ille ait; Carpentes diem,

Erunt enim futura præsentia vice sua. *Quare sufficit sollicitudo præsentium. Neq; tamen curæ moderatæ, siue sint æconomicæ, siue publicæ siue rerum mandatarum notantur. Sed hic duplex est excessus. Primus cùm curarum series in longitudinem nimiã, & tempora remotiora extendimus, ac si prouidentiã diuinam apparatu nostro ligare possemus, quod semper etiam apud Ethnicos infaustum & insolens fuit. Fere enim qui Fortunæ multum tribuerunt, & ad occasiones præsentes alacres, & præstò fuerunt, felicitate magna vsi sunt.*

ſunt. Qui autem altum ſapientes, omnia curata & meditata habere conſiſi ſunt, infortunia ſubierunt. Secundus exceſſus eſt, cùm in curis immoramur diutiùs quàm opus eſt ad iuſtam deliberationem, & ad decretum faciendum. Quis enim noſtrûm eſt, qui tantum curet, quantum ſufficit, vt ſe explicet, nel ſeſe explicare non poſſe iudicet, & nõ eadem ſæpe retractet, & in eodem cogitationum circuitu inutiliter hæreat, & deniq; euaneſcat? Quod genus curarum, & diuinis & humanis rationibus aduerſiſſimum eſt.

De Spe terreſtri.

Melior eſt oculorum viſio, quàm animi progreſsio.

Enſus purus in ſingula meliorẽ reddit conditionem, & politiam mentis, quàm iſtæ imaginationes & progreſsiones animi. Natura enim animi humani etiã in ingenijs grauiſsimis eſt, vt a ſenſu ſingulorum ſtatim progrediatur, & ſaliat, & omnia auguretur fore talia, quale illud eſt quod præſentem ſenſum incutit,

ſi

ſi boni eſt ſenſus, facilis eſt ad ſpem indefinitam, ſi mali eſt ſenſus, ad metum: vnde illud, Fallitur augurio ſpes bona ſæpe ſuo, *& contra illud,* Peſsimus in dubijs augur. *Sed tamen timoris eſt aliquis fructus, præparat enim tolerantiam, & acuit induſtriam,* Non vlla laborum ô virgo noua mî facies inopauè ſurgit. *Omnia præcepi, atq; animo mecum ante peregi. Spes vero inutile quiddam videtur. Quorſùm enim iſta anticipatio boni? Attende, ſi minùs eueniat bonum quàm ſperes, bonum licet ſit, tamen quia minùs ſit, videtur*

detur damnum potiùs quàm lucrum ob excessum spei. Si par & tantum sit, & euentus sit spei æqualis, tamen flos boni per spem decerpitur, & videtur ferè obsoletum, & fastidio magis finitimum. Si maior sit successus spe, videtur aliquid lucrifactum, verum est; sed annon melius fuisset sortem lucri feciſſe nihil sperando quàm vsuram minùs sperando? Atq; in rebus secundis ita operatur spes; in malis autem robur. verum animi soluit. Nã neq; semper spei materia suppetit, & destitutione aliqua vel minima spei, vniuersa fere firmitudo

animi

animi corruit, & minorem efficit dignitatem mentis, cùm mala toleramus alienatione quadam, & errore mentis, non fortitudine & iudicio. Quare ſatis leniter finxêre Poetæ ſpem antidotum humanorum morborum eſſe, quòd dolores eorum mitiget, cùm ſit reuera incenſio potiùs, & exaſperatio, quæ eos multiplicari, & recrudeſcere faciat. Nihilominùs ſit, vt plæriq; hominum imaginationibus ſpei & progreſſionibus iſtis mentis omninò ſe dedant, ingratiq; in præterita obliti ferè præſentium ſemper iuuenes, tantùm futuris immineant.

iuuenum natura;

ant. Vidi vniuersos ambulantes sub sole cum adolescente secundo, qui consurget post eum; quod pessimus morbus est, & status mentis insanissimus. *Quæras fortasse annon melius sit, cùm res in dubia expectatione positæ sint, bene diuinare, & potiùs sperare quàm diffidere, cùm spes maiorem tranquillitatem animi conciliet. Ego sane in omni mora, & expectatione tranquillum, & non fluctuantem animi statum ex bona mentis politia, & compositione, summum humanæ vitæ firmamentum iudico. Sed eam tranquillitatem, quæ*

ex

ex ſpe pendeat, vt leuem & infirmam recuſo. Non quia non conueniat tam bona quàm mala ex ſana & ſobria coniectura præuidere, & præſupponere, vt actiones ad probabilitatem euentuum magis accommodemus; modò ſit hoc officium intellectus ac iudicij cum iuſta inclinatione affectus. Sed quis ita ſpes coercuit; vt cùm ex vigilanti & firmo mentis diſcurſu meliora, vt magis probabilia ſibi prædixerit, non in ipſa boni anticipatione immoratus ſit, & huiuſmodi cogitationi, vt ſomnio placido indulſerit? Atq; hoc eſt quod

reddit

reddit animum leuem, tumidum, inæqualem, peregrinantem. Quare omnis spes in futuram vitam cælestem consumenda est. Hic autem quãto purior sit præsentium sensus absq; infectione, & tinctura imaginationis, tanto prudentior & melior anima vitæ summæ breuis spem nos vetat inchoare longam.

De Hypocritis.

Misericordiam volo, & non Sacrificium.

OMnis iactatio Hypocritarum est in operibus primæ tabulæ

bulæ legis, quæ eſt de venerationibus Deo debitis. Ratio duplex eſt, tum quòd huiuſmodi opera maiorem habent pompam Sanctitatis, tum quòd cupiditatibus eorum minùs aduerſentur. Itaq; redargutio hypocritarum eſt, vt ab operibus ſacrificij remittantur ad opera miſericordiæ, vnde illud, Religio munda & immaculata apud Deum & patrem hæc eſt, viſitare pupillos & viduas in tribulatione eorum, *& illud,* Qui nõ diligit fratrem ſuum quem vidit, Deum quem non vidit quomodo poteſt diligere? *Quidam autem*

autem altioris & inflatioris Hypocriſiæ ſeipſos decipientes, & exiſtimantes ſe arctiore cum Deo conuerſatione dignos, officia charitatis in proximum vt minora negligunt. Qui error monaſticæ vitæ non principium quidem dedit, (nam initia bona fuerunt,) ſed exceſſum addidit. Rectè enim dictũ eſt, Orandi munus magnum eſſe munus in eccleſia, *& ex vſu eccleſiæ eſt, vt ſint cœtus hominum â mundanis curis ſoluti, qui aſſiduis & deuotis precibus Deum pro eccleſiæ ſtatu ſollicitent. Sed huic ordinationi illa hypocriſia finitima eſt,*

est, nec vniuersa institutio reprobatur, sed spiritus illi se efferentes cohibentur: nam & Enoch qui ambulauit cũ Deo, prophetizauit, vt est apud Iudam, atq; fructum suæ prophetiæ ecclesiam donauit. Et Iohannes Bapt. quem Principem quidam vitæ monasticæ volunt, multo ministerio functus est tum prophetizationis, tum Baptizationis. Nam ad alios istos in deum officiosos refertur illa interrogatio, Si iustè egeris, quid donabis Deo, aut quid de manu tua accipiet. *Quare opera misericordiæ sunt opera discretionis hypo-*

hypocritarum. Contra autem fit cum hæreticis, nam vt hypocritæ simulata sua sanctitate versus Deum, iniurias suas versus homines obducunt; ita hæretici moralitate quadam versus homines blasphemias suas contra Deum insinuant.

De Impostoribus.

Siue mẽte excedimus Deo,
siue sobrii sumus vobis.

Vera est ista effigies, & verum temperamentum viri, cui Religio penitùs in præcordijs insedit, & veri operarij Dei. Conuer-

Conuerſatio ei quæ cum Deo eſt, plena exceſſus, & zeli, & extaſis. Hinc gemitus ineffabiles, & exultationes, & raptus ſpiritus, & agones. At quæ cum hominibus eſt, plena manſuetudinis, & ſobrietatis, & morigerationis; Hinc Omnia omnibus factus ſum, *& huiuſmodi. Contra fit in hypocritis & impoſtoribus: Ii enim in populo & eccleſia incendunt ſe & excedunt, & veluti ſacris furoribus afflati omnia miſcent. Si quis autem eorum ſolitudines, & ſeparatas meditationes, & cum Deo cõuerſationes introſpiciat, deprehendet eas non tantum*

tantum frigidas, & ſine motu, ſed plenas malitiæ & fermenti, ſobrij Deo, mente excedentes populo.

De generibus impoſturæ.

Deuita prophanas vocum nouitates, & oppoſitiones falſi nominis ſcientiæ.

Ineptas & aniles fabulas deuita.

Nemo vos decipiat in ſublimitate ſermonum.

Res ſunt ſermones, & veluti ſtili impoſturæ. Primum genus eſt eorum

rum qui ſtatim vt aliquam materiam nacti ſunt, artem conficiunt, vocabula artis imponunt, omnia in diſtinctiones redigunt, inde poſita vel themata educunt, & ex quæſtionibus, & reſponſionibus oppoſitiones conficiunt; Hinc Scholaſticorum quiſquiliæ & turbæ. Secundum genus eſt eorum, qui vanitate ingenij, vt ſacra quidem Poetæ, omnem exemplorum varietatem ad mentes hominum tractandas confingunt, vnde vitæ patrum, & antiquorum hæreticorum figmenta innumera. Tertium genus eorum, qui myſterijs,

& grandiloquijs, allegorijs, & alluſionibus omnia implet: quod genus myſticum & gnoſticum complures hæretici ſibi delegerunt. Primum genus ſenſum & captum hominis illaqueat, ſecundum allicit, tertium ſtupefacit, ſeducunt vero omnia.

De Atheiſmo.

Dixit inſipiens in corde ſuo, non eſt Deus.

PRimum dixit in corde, non ait, cogitauit in corde; hoc eſt, non tam ita ſentit penitùs, ſed vult hoc credere; quoniam expedire

expedire ſibi videt, vt non ſit Deus omni ratione ſibi hoc ſuadere, & in animum inducere conatur; & tanquàm thema aliquod, vel poſitum, vel placitum aſſerere, & aſtruere, & firmare ſtudet. Manet tamen ille igniculus luminis primi, quo Diuinitatem agnoſcimus, quẽ prorſus extinguere, & ſtimulum illum ex corde euellere fruſtrà nititur. Quare ex malitia voluntatis ſuæ, & non ex natiuo ſenſu, & iudicio hoc ſupponit, vt ait comicus Poeta. Tunc animus meus acceſsit ad meam ſententiam, *quaſi ipſe aliter eſſet ab animo*

ſuo. Itaq; Atheiſta magis dixit in corde, quàm ſentit in corde, quòd non ſit Deus. Secundò, dixit in corde, non ore locutus eſt, ſed notandum eſt hoc metu legis & famæ fieri, Nam vt ait ille, Negare Deos difficile eſt in concione populi, ſed in conceſſu familiari expeditum. *Nam ſi hoc vinculum tollatur è medio, non eſt hæreſis quæ maiore ſtudio ſe pandere, & ſpargere, & multiplicare nitatur quàm Atheiſmus. Nec videas eos qui in hanc mentis inſaniam immerſi ſunt, aliud ferè ſpirare, & importunè inculcare,*

re, quàm verba atheiſmi, vt in Lucretio Epicurco, qui ferè ſuam in Religionem inuectiuam ſingulis alijs ſubiectis intercalarem facit. Ratio videtur eſſe, quòd Atheiſta cum ſibi nō ſatis acquieſcat æſtuans, nec ſibi ſatiſcredens, & crebra ſuæ opinionis deliquia in interioribus patiens ab aliorum aſſenſu refocillari cupit. Nam recte dictum eſt. Qui alteri opinionem approbare ſedulò cupit, ipſe diffidit. *Tertiò inſipiens eſt, qui hoc in corde dixit, quod veriſſimum eſt, non tantum quòd diuina non ſapiat, ſed etiam ſecundum hominem.*

Primò enim ingenia, quæ sunt in Atheismum proniora, videas ferè leuia, & dicacia, & audacula, & insolentia: eius deniq; compositionis, quæ prudentiæ, & grauitati morum aduersissima est. Secundò inter viros politicos, qui altioris ingenij & latioris cordis fuerunt, Religionem non arte quadam ad populum adhibuerunt, sed interiore dogmate coluêre, vt qui prouidentiæ & fortunæ plurimũ tribuerint. Contra qui artibus suis, & industrijs, & causis proximis, & apparẽtibus omnia ascripserunt, & vt ait Propheta, Retibus suis immolarunt, pusilli

pusilli fuerunt politici, & circumforanei, & magnitudinis actionum incapaces. *Tertiò, in physicis & illud affirmo parùm Philosophiæ naturalis, & in ea progressum liminarem ad Atheismum opiniones inclinare. Contra multùm Philosophiæ naturalis, & progressum in ea penetrantem ad Religionem animos circumferre. Quare atheismus stultitiæ & inscitiæ vbique coniunctus esse videtur, vt meritò sit dictum*, Insipientium non est Deus.

Meditationes

De Hæresibus.

Erratis nescientes scripturas, neque potestatem Dei.

Canon iste mater omnium canonum aduersus hæreses. Duplex erroris causa, ignoratio, vel leuior contemplatio potestatis dei. Voluntas dei reuelatur magis per scripturas scrutamini, potestas magis per creaturas contemplamini. Ita asserenda plenitudo potestatis Dei, ne maculemus voluntatem. Ita asserenda bonitas

bonitas voluntatis, ne minuamus poteſtatem. Itaque Religio vera ſita eſt in mediocritate inter ſuperſtitionem cum hæreſibus ſuperſtitioſis ex vna parte, & Atheiſmum cum hæreſibus prophanis ex altera. Superſtitio repudiata luce ſcripturarum, ſeque dedens traditionibus prauis vel apocryphis, & nouis reuelationibus, vel falſis interpretationibus ſcripturarum multa de voluntate Dei fingit, & ſomniat, à ſcripturis dewia & aliena. Atheiſmus autem & Theomachia contra poteſtatem Dei inſurgit, & tumultuatur,

verbo dei non credens, quod voluntatem eius reuelat ob incredulitatem poteſtatis eius, cui omnia ſunt poſsibilia. Hæreſes autem quæ ex iſto fonte emanant, grauiores videntur cæteris. Nam & in politijs atrocius eſt poteſtatem & maieſtatem minuere, quàm famam principis notare. Hæreſium autem quæ poteſtatem Dei minuunt, præter Atheiſmum purum tres ſunt gradus, habentq; vnum & idem myſterium: (Nam omnis antichriſtianiſmus operatur in myſterio, id eſt ſub imagine boni) hoc ipſum, vt voluntatem dei ab omni aſperſione malitiæ liberet.

beret. Primus gradus est eorum, qui duo principia constituunt paria, ac inter se pugnantia, & contraria, vnum boni, alterum mali. Secundus gradus est eorum, quibus nimiùm læsa videtur maiestas Dei in constituendo aduersus eum principio affirmatiuo & actiuo. Quare extu̇bata tali audacia, nihilo minùs inducunt contra deum principium negatiuum & priuatiuum. Nam volunt esse opus ipsius materiæ & creaturæ internum, & natiuum, & substantiuum, vt ex se vergat & relabatur ad confusionem, & ad nihilum, nescientes eius-

dem esse omnipotentiæ ex aliquo nihil facere, cuius ex nihilo aliquid. Tertius gradus est eorum, qui arctant & restringunt opinionem, priorem tantùm ad actiones humanas, quæ participant ex peccato, quas volunt substantiuè, absq; nexu aliquo causarum, ex interna voluntate & arbitrio humano pendere, statuuntq; latiores terminos scientiæ Dei, quàm potestatis, vel potius eius partis potestatis Dei, (nam & ipsa scientia potestas est) qua scit, quàm eius, quâ mouet, & agit, vt præsciat quædam otiosè, quæ non prædestinet &

præordi-

præordinet. Et non absimile est figmento, quod Epicurus introduxit in Democritissimum, vt fatum tolleret, & fortunæ locum daret, declinationem videlicet atomi, quod semper à prudentioribus inanissimum commentum habitum est. Sed quicquid a deo non pendet, vt autore, & principio, per nexus & gradus subordinatos id loco Dei erit, & nouum principium, & Deaster quidem. Quare meritò illa opinio respuitur, vt læsio & diminutio maiestatis & potestatis Dei. Et tamen admodum rectè dicitur, quòd Deus non sit author mali,

non

non quia non author, sed quia non mali.

De ecclesia & Scripturis.

Proteges eos in tabernaculo tuo à contradictione linguarum.

Contradictiones linguarum vbiq; occurrunt extra tabernaculũ Dei. Quare quocunq; te verteris, exitum controuersiarũ non reperies nisi huc te receperis. Dices verum est, nempe in vnitate ecclesiæ. Sed aduerte. Erat

in

in tabernaculo Arca, & in Arca Testimonium vel tabulæ legis. Quid mihi narras corticem Tabernaculi, sine nucleo testimonij? Tabernaculum ad custodiendum & tradendum testimonium erat ordinatum. Eodem modo & ecclesiæ custodia, & traditio per manus scripturarum demandata est, sed anima Tabernaculi est testimonium.

FINIS.

OF
The Colours of good and euill a fragment.

1597.

1 *Cui ceteræ partes vel secta secundas vnanimiter deferunt, cum singula principatum sibi vindicent melior reliquis videtur. Nam primas quæque ex zelo videtur sumere; secundas autem ex vero tribuere.*

2 *Cuius excellentia vel exuperantia melior id toto genere melius.*

3 *Quod ad veritatem refertur maius est quàm quod ad opinionem. Modus autem, & probatio eius quod ad opinionem pertinet hæc est. Quod quis si clam putaret fore facturus non esset.*

4 *Quod rem integram seruat bonum quod sine receptu est malum. Nam se recipere non posse impotentia genus est, potentia autem bonum.*

5 *Quod ex pluribus constat, & diuisibilius est maius quàm quod ex paucioribus & magis vnum: nam omnia per partes considerata maiora videntur; quare & pluralitas partium magnitudinem præ se fert, fortiùs autem operatur pluralitas partium si ordo absit, nam inducit similitudinem infiniti, &*

impedit

impedit comprehensionem.

6 Cuius priuatio bona, malum, cuius priuatio mala bonum.

7 Quod bono, vicinum bonum, quod a bono remotum malum.

8 Quod quis culpa sua contraxit, maius malum, quod ab externis imponitur minus malum.

9 Quod opera, & virtute nostra partum est, maius bonum, quod ab alieno beneficio, vel ab indulgentia fortunæ delatum est, minus bonum.

10 Gradus priuationis maior videtur quam gradus diminutionis, & rursus gradus inceptionis maior videtur quam gradus incrementi.

In

IN deliberatiues the pointe is what is good & what is euil, and of good what is greater, & of euill what is the leſſe.

So that the perſuaders labour is to make thinges appeare good or euill, and that in higher or lower degree, which as it may bee performed by true and ſolide reaſons, ſo it may bee repreſented alſo by coulers, popularities and circumſtances,

cumſtances, which are of ſuch force, as they ſway the ordinarie iudgement eyther of a weake man, or of a wiſe man, not fully and conſiderately attending and pondering the matter. Beſides their power to alter the nature of the ſubiect in appearance, and ſo to leade to errour, they are of no leſſe vſe to quicken & ſtrengthen the opinions and perſwaſions which are true: for reaſons plainely deliuered, & alwaies after one manner eſpecially with fine and faſtidious mindes, enter

but

but heauily and dully; whereas if they bee varied and haue more life and vigor put into them by theſe formes and inſinuations, they cauſe a ſtronger apprehenſion, and many times ſuddenly winne the minde to a reſolution. Laſtly, to make a true & ſafe iudgement, nothing can be of greater vſe and defence to the minde, then the diſcouering and reprehenſion of theſe colours, ſhewing in what caſes they hold & in what they deceiue: which as it

cannot

cannot be done, but out of a very vniuerſall knowledge of the nature of things, ſo being performed, it ſo cleareth mans iudgement and election, as it is the leſſe apt to ſlide into any errour.

A Table of the Colours, or apparances of good & euill, and their degrees as places of perſuaſion & diſſuaſion, and their ſeueral allaxes, & the elenches of them.

Cui ceteræ partes vel ſectæ ſecundas vnanimiter deferunt, cum ſingulæ principatum ſibi vendicent melior reliquis videtur, nam primas quæque ex zelo videtur ſumere, ſecundas autem ex vero & merito tribuere.

SO *Cicero* went about to proue the Secte of *Academiques* which ſuſpended

pended all alleueration, for to bee the beſt, for ſaith he, aske a *Stoicke* which philoſophie is true, hee will preferre his owne: Then aske him which approcheth next the truth, he wil confeſſe the *Academiques*. So deale with the *Epicure* that will ſcant indure the *Stoicke* to bee in ſight of him, as ſoone as he hath placed himſelfe, hee will place the *Academiques* next him.

So if a Prince tooke diuers competitors to a place, and examined them ſeuerally whome next themſelues they woulde ratheſt commend, it were like the ableſt man ſhoulde haue the moſt ſecond votes.

The

The fallax of this colour happeneth oft in reſpect of enuie, for men are accuſtomed after themſelues and their owne faction to incline to them which are ſofteſt, and are leaſt in their way in deſpite & derogation of them that hold them hardeſt to it. So that this colour of melioritie and preheminence is oft a ſigne of eneruation and weakenes.

2. *Cuius excellentia vel exuperantia melior, id toto genere melius.*

APpertaining to this are the fourmes: *Let vs not wander in generalities: Let vs*

vs compare particular with particular, &c. This appearance though it seeme of strength and rather Logicall then Rhetoricall, yet is very oft a tallax.

Sometimes becauſe ſome things are in kinde very caſuall, which if they eſcape, proue excellent, ſo that the kind is inferiour, becauſe it is ſo ſubiect to peril, but that which is excellent being proued is ſuperior, as the bloſſome of March and the bloſſome of May, whereof the French verſe goeth.

Bourgeon de Mars enfant de Paris,
Si vn eſchape, il en vaut dix.

So that the bloſſome of May

May is generally better thē the bloſſome of March, and yet the beſt bloſſome of March is better then the beſt bloſſome of May.

Sometimes, becauſe the nature of ſome kindes is to be more equall and more indifferent, and not to haue very diſtant degrees, as hath beene noted in the warmer clymates, the people are generally more wiſe, but in the Northerne climate the wits of chiefe are greater. So in manie Armies, if the matter ſhould be tried by ducll betweene two Champions, the victorie ſhoulde goe on one ſide, and yet if it bee tryed by the groſſe, it woulde go of the other ſide; for excel-

lencies goe as it were by chaunce, but kindes goe by a more certaine nature, as by diſcipline in warre.

Laſtly many kindes haue much refuſe which counteruaile that which they haue excellent, and therefore generally mettall is more precious then Stone, and yet a Diamond is more precious then gold.

3 *Quod ad veritatem refertur maius eſt quàm quod ad opinionem. Modus autem & probatio eius quod ad opinionem pertinet, hæc eſt, quod quis ſi clam putaret fore, facturus non eſſet.*

So

SO the Epicures ſay of the Stoicks felicitie placed in vertue, That it is like the felicitie of a Player, who if he were left of his auditorie & their applauſe, hee woulde ſtreight bee out of heart and countenance, and therefore they call vertue *Bonum theatrale*. But of riches the Poet ſaith:

Populus me ſibilat,
At mihi plaudo.

And of pleaſure. *imo*

Grata ſub vul-
Gaudia corde premens,
tu ſimulate pudorem.

The Fallax of this colour is

ſomewhat ſubtile, though the aunſwere to the example bee readie, for vertue is not choſen *propter auram popularem*. But contrariwiſe, *Maximè omnium teipſum reuerere*, So as a vertuous man will be vertuous in *ſolitudine*, and not onely in *theatro*, though percaſe it will bee more ſtronge by glorie and fame, as an heate which is doubled by reflection; But that denieth the ſuppoſition it doth not repreh̄d the fallax, whereof the reprehenſion is Alow, that vertue (ſuch as is ioyned with labor and conflict) would not be choſen but for fame and opinion, yet it followeth not that the chiefe motiue of the

the election ſhould not bee reall and for it ſelfe, for fame may be onely *cauſa impulſiua*, and not *cauſa conſtituens*, or *efficiens*. As if there were two horſes, and the one wold doo better without the ſpur then the other: but againe the other with the ſpur wold farre exceede the doing of the former, giuing him the ſpurre alſo, yet the latter wil be iudged to bee the better horſe, and the fourme as to ſay, *Tuſh, the life of this horſe is but in the ſpurre*, will not ſerue as to a wiſe iudgement: For ſince the ordinarie inſtrument of horſemanſhippe is the ſpurre, and that it is no manner of impediment nor burden, the horſe

is not to bee reckounted the leſſe of, which will not doo well without the ſpurre, but rather the other is to be reckoned a delicacy then a vertue, ſo glory and honour are the ſpurres to vertue: and although vertue woulde languiſhe without them, yet ſince they be alwaies at hand to attende vertue, vertue is not to be ſaid the leſſe choſen for it ſelf, becauſe it needeth the ſpurre of fame and reputation: and therefore that poſition, *Nota eius rei quod propter opinionem & non propter veritatem eligitur, hæc eſt, quod quis ſi clam putaret fore, facturus non eſſet*, is repre-

hended.

4 *Quod rem integram ſeruat bonum, quod ſine receptu eſt malum. Nam ſe recipere non poſſe impotentiæ genus eſt, potentia autem bonum.*

HEreof *Aeſope* framed the fable of the two Frogges that conſulted together in time of drowth (when many plaſhes that they had repayred to were drie) what was to bee done, and the one propounded to go down into a deepe Well, becauſe it was like the water woulde not fayle there, but the other aunſwered, yea but if it doo faile howe ſhall wee get vp agayne?

And the reaſon is, that humane actions are ſo vncertayne and ſubiect to perils, as that ſeemeth the beſt courſe which hath moſt paſſages out of it.

Appertayning to this perſuaſion the forms are, *you ſhal ingage your ſelf*, On the other ſide, *Tantum quantum voles ſumes ex fortuna*, you ſhall keepe the matter in your owne handes. The reprehenſion of it is, *That proceeding and reſoluing in all actions is neceſſarie*: for as he ſayeth well, *Not to reſolue, is to reſolue*, and many times it breeds as many neceſsities, and ingageth as far in ſome other ſort as to reſolue.

So it is but the couetous

mans

mans diſeaſe tranſlated into power, for the couetous man wil inioy nothing becauſe he will haue his ful ſtore & poſſibility to inioy the more, ſo by this reaſon a man ſhold execute nothing becauſe he ſhould be ſtill indifferent & at libertye to execute any thing. Beſides neceſsitie and this ſame *iacta eſt alea* hath many times an aduantage, becauſe it awaketh the powers of the mind, & ſtrengtheneth indeuour. *Cæteris pares neceſsitate certe ſuperiores eſtis.*

5 *Quod ex pluribus constat & diuisibilius est maius quã quod ex paucioribus et magis vnum: nam omnia per partes considerata maiora videntur, quare et pluralitas partium magnitudinẽ præ se fert, fortius autem operatur pluralitas partium si ordo absit, nam inducit similitudinem infiniti et impedit comprehẽsionem.*

THis colour seemeth palpable, for it is not plurality of partes without maiority of partes that maketh the totall greater, yet neuertheless it often carries the mind away, yea, it deceiueth the

the ſence, as it ſeemeth to the eye a ſhorter diſtance of way if it bee all deade and continued, then if it haue trees or buildinges or any other marks whereby the eye may deuide it. So when a great monied man hath deuided his cheſts and coines, and bagges, hee ſeemeth to himſelfe richer then he was, and therefore a way to amplifie any thing, is to breake it, and to make an anatomie of it in ſeuerall partes, and to examine it according to ſeuerall circumſtances. And this maketh the greater ſhewe if it bee done without order, for confuſion maketh thinges muſter more, and beſides what

what is ſet downe by order and diuiſion, doth demonſtrate that nothing is left out or omitted, but all is there, whereas if it be without order, both the mind comprehendeth leſſe that which is ſet downe, and beſides it leaueth a ſuſpition, as if more might be ſaide then is expreſſed.

This Colour deceyueth, if the minde of him that is to bee perſuaded, doo of it ſelfe ouer-conceyue or preiudge of the greatnes of any thing, for then the breaking of it will make it ſeeme leſſe, becauſe it maketh it appeare more accordinge to the trueth, and therefore if a man bee in ſickneſſe

or

or paine, the time will ſeeme longer without a clocke or hower-glaſſe then with it, for the minde doth value euery moment, and then the hower doth rather ſumme vp the moments then deuide the day. So in a dead playne, the way ſeemeth the longer, becauſe the eye hath preconceiued it ſhorter then the truth: and the fruſtrating of that maketh it ſeeme longer then the truth. Therfore if any man haue an ouer-great opinion of any thing, then if an other think by breaking it into ſeuerall conſiderations, he ſhal make it ſeeme greater to him, he will be deceyued, and therefore in ſuch caſes it is not

ſafe

ſafe to deuide, but to extoll the entire ſtill in generall.

An other caſe wherein this couler deceyueth, is, when the matter broken or deuided is not comprehended by the ſence or minde at once in reſpect of the diſtracting or ſcattering of it, and being intire and not deuided, is comprehended, as a hundred poundes in heapes of fiue poundes will ſhew more then in one groſſe heape, ſo as the heapes be all vppon one table to be ſeene at once, otherwiſe not, or flowers growing ſcattered in diuers beds will ſhewe, more then if they did grow in one bed, ſo as all thoſe beds be within a plot that they

they be obiect to view at once, otherwiſe not; And therefore men whoſe liuing lieth together in one Shire, are cõmonly counted greater landed then thoſe whoſe liuings are diſperſed though it be more, becauſe of the notice and comprehenſion.

A third caſe wherein this couler deceiueth, and it is not ſo properly a caſe or reprehenſion as it is a countercouler beeing in effect as large as the couler it ſelfe, and that is, *Omnis compoſitio indigentiæ cuiuſdam videtur eſſe particeps*, becauſe if one thing would ſerue the turne it were euer beſt, but the defect and imperfections of things hath

hath brought in that help to piece them vp as it is ſayd, *Martha Martha attendis ad plurima, vnum ſufficit.* So likewiſe hereupon *Aeſope* framed the Fable of the Fox and the Cat, whereas the Fox bragged what a number of ſhifts and deuiſes he had to get from the hounds, and the Cat ſayde ſhe had but one, which was, to clime a tree, which in proofe was better worth then all the reſt, whereof the prouerbe grew, *Multa nouit Vulpes ſed Felis vnum magnum.* And in the morall of this fable it comes likewiſe to paſſe: That a good ſure friend is a better help at a pinch, then all the ſtratagems and pollicies

cies of a mans owne wit. So it falleth out to bee a common errour in negociating, whereas men haue many reaſons to induce or perſwade, they ſtriue commonly to vtter and vſe them all at once, which weakeneth them. For it argueth as was ſaid, a needines in euery of the reaſons by it ſelfe, as if one did not truſt to any of them, but fled from one to another, helping himſelfe onely with that. *Et quæ non proſunt ſingula multa iuuant.* Indeed in a ſet ſpeech in an aſſemblie it is expected a man ſhould vſe all his reaſons in the caſe he handleth, but in priuate perſwaſions it is alwayes a great errour.

A fourth caſe wherein this colour may be reprehended is in reſpect of that ſame *vis vnita fortior*, according to the tale of the French King, that when the Emperours Ambaſ. had recited his mayſters ſtile at large, which conſiſteth of many countries and dominions: the French King willed his Chauncellor or other miniſter to repeate and ſay ouer Fraunce as many times as the other had recited the ſeuerall dominions, intending it was equiualēt with them all, and beſide more compacted & vnited.

There is alſo appertayning to this couler an other point, why breaking of a thing doth helpe it, not by way of adding

adding a ſhew of magnitude vnto it, but a note of excellency and raritie; whereof the ſourmes are, *Where ſhall you finde ſuch a concurrence? Great but not compleat*, for it ſeemes a leſſe worke of nature or fortune to make any thing in his kinde greater then ordinary, then to make a ſtrange compoſition.

Yet if it be narrowly conſidered, this colour will be reprehended or incountred by imputing to all excellencies in compoſitions a kinde of pouertie or at leaſt a caſualty or ieopardy, for from that which is excellent in greatnes ſomewhat may be takē, or there may be decay, and yet ſufficiencie left, but from

from that which hath his price in compoſition if you take away any thing, or any part do faile, all is diſgraced.

6. *Cuius priuatio bona, malum, cuius priuatio mala, bonum.*

THe formes to make it conceyued that that was euil which is chaunged for the better are, *He that is in hell thinks there is no other heauen. Satis quercus, Acornes were good till bread was found, &c.* And of the other ſide the formes to make it cõceyued that that was good which was changed for the worſe are, *Bona magis carendo quàm fruendo*

fruendo ſentimus, Bona à tergo formoſiſsima, Good things neuer appeare in their ful beautie, till they turne their backe, and be going away, &c. The reprehenſion of this colour is, that the good or euill which is remoued may be eſteemed good or euill comparatiuely and not poſitiuely or ſimply. So that if the priuation be good, it follows not the former condition was euill, but leſſe good, for the flower or bloſſome is a poſitiue good, although the remoue of it to giue place to the fruite be a comparatiue good. So in the tale of Æſope when the old fainting man in the heate of the day caſt downe his burthen and called

led for death, & when death came to know his will with him, ſaid it was for nothing but to help him vp with his burthen agayne: it doth not follow that becauſe death which was the priuation of the burthen was ill, therefore the burthen was good. And in this part the ordinarie forme of *Malum neceſſarium* aptly reprehendeth this colour, for *Priuatio mali neceſſarij eſt mala*, and yet that doth not conuert the nature of the neceſſarie euil, but it is euill.

Againe it commeth ſometimes to paſſe, that there is an equalitie in the change or priuation, and as it were a *Dilemma boni*, or a *Dilemma mali*,

mali, ſo that the corruption of the one good is a generation of the other, *Sorti pater æquus vtrique eſt*: And contrarie the remedy of the one euill is the occaſion and commencement of an other, as in *Scilla* and *Charibdis*.

7. *Quod bono vicinum, bonum: quod a bono remotum malum.*

SVch is the nature of thinges, that thinges contrarye and diſtant in nature and qualitie are alſo ſeuered and diſioyned in place, and thinges lyke and conſenting in qualitie are placed, and as it were quarte-

quartered together, for partly in regard of the nature to spred, multiplie and infect in similitude, and partly in regarde of the nature to breake, expell and alter that which is disagreeable and contrarie, most things doe eyther associate and drawe neere to thēselues the like, or at least assimilate to thē-selues that which approcheth neere them, and doe also driue away, chase, and exterminate their contraries, And that is the reason commonly yeelded why the middle region of the aire should be coldest, becausse the Sunne and Starres are eyther hot by direct beames or by reflection. The direct

beames

beames heate the vpper region, the reflected beames frō the earth and ſeas heate the lower Region. That which is in the middeſt being furtheſt diſtant in place from theſe two Regions of heate are moſt diſtant in nature that is coldeſt, which is that they tearme colde or hot, *per antiperiſtaſin*, that is, inuironing by contraries, which was pleaſantly taken hold of by him that ſaid that an honeſt man in theſe daies muſt needes be more honeſt then in ages heretofore, *propter antiperiſtaſin*, becauſe the ſhutting of him in the middeſt of contraries muſt needes make the honeſtie ſtronger, and more compact

in it ſelfe. The reprehenſion of this colour is, firſt many things of amplitude in their kinde do as it were ingroſſe to themſelues all, and leaue that which is next them moſt deſtitute, as the ſhootes or vnderwood that grow neare a great & ſpread tree, is the moſt pyned and ſhrubbie wood of the field, becauſe the great tree doth depriue and deceiue them of the ſap and nouriſhment. So he ſaith wel, *Diuitis ſerui maximè ſerui*: And the compariſon was pleaſant of him that compared courtiers attendāt in the courts of princes, without great place or office, to faſting dayes, which were next the holy daies, but otl.er-

otherwiſe were the leaneſt dayes in all the weeke.

An other reprehenſion is, that things of greatnes and predominancie, though they do not extenuate the things adioyning in ſubſtance; yet they drowne them and obſcure them in ſhew and appearance. And therefore the Aſtronomers ſay, that whereas in all other Planets coniunction is the perfecteſt amitie: the Sunne contrarywiſe is good by aſpect, but euill by coniunction.

A third reprehenſion is, becauſe euill approcheth to good ſometimes for concealement, ſometimes for protection, and good to euill for conuerſion and reformation. So hipocriſie draweth

neere to religion for couert and hiding it selfe: *Sæpe latet vitium proximitate boni*, and Sanctuary men which were commonly inordinate men and malefactors, were wont to be neereſt to prieſts and Prelates and holy men, for the maieſtie of good things is ſuch, as the confines of them are reuered. On the other ſide our Sauiour charged with neerenes of Publicanes and rioters ſaid, *The Phiſitian approcheth the ſicke, rather then the whole.*

8. *Quod quis culpa ſua contraxit, maius malum; quod ab externis imponitur, minus malum.*

The

THe reaſon is, becauſe the ſting and remorſe of the minde accuſing it ſelfe doubleth all aduerſitie, contrariwiſe the cõſidering and recording inwardly that a man is cleare and free from fault, and iuſt imputation, doth attemper outward calamities: For if the euill be in the ſence and in the conſcience both, there is a gemination of it, but if euill be in the one and comfort in the other, it is a kind of compenſation. So the Poets in tragedies do make the moſt paſsionate lamentations, and thoſe that fore-run final diſpaire, to be accuſing, queſtioning and torturing of a mans ſelfe.

Seque vnum clamat cauſamque caputque malorum. And cõtrariwiſe the extremities of worthie perſons haue bin annihilated in the conſideration of their owne good deſeruing. Beſides when the euill commeth from without, there is left a kinde of euaporation of griefe, if it come by humane iniurie, eyther by indignation and meditating of reuenge from our ſelues, or by expecting or foreconceyuing that *Nemeſis* & retribution will take holde of the authours of our hurt, or if it be by fortune or accident, yet there is left a kinde of expoſtulation againſt thediuine powers.

Atque Deos atque aſtra vocat crudelia mater.

But

But where the euill is deriued from a mans own fault, there all ſtrikes deadly inwards, and ſuffocateth.

The reprehenſion of this colour is firſt in reſpect of hope, for reformation of our faultes is in *noſtra poteſtate*, but amendment of our fortune ſimplie is not. Therefore *Demoſthenes* in many of his orations, ſayth thus to the people of *Athens*, *That which hauing regarde to the time paſt is the worſt point and circumſtance of all the reſt, that as to the time to come is the beſt: What is that? Euen this, that by your ſloth, irreſolution, and miſgouernmẽt, your affaires are growne to this declinatiõ and decay. For had you*

vſed and ordered your meanes and forces to the beſt, and done your partes euery way to the full, and notwithſtanding your matters ſhould haue gone backwards in this manner as they doe, there had beene no hope left of recouerie or reparation, but ſince it hath beene onely by your owne errours, &c. So *Epictetus* in his degrees ſaith, *The worſt ſtate of man is to accuſe externe things, better then that to accuſe a mans ſelfe, and beſt of all to accuſe neyther.*

An other reprehenſion of this colour is in reſpect of the well bearing of euils, wherwith a man can charge no body but himſelfe, which maketh them the leſſe.

Leue fit quod bene fertur onus.

And

And therfore many natures, that are eyther extreamely proude, and will take no fault to themſelues, or elſe very true, and cleauing to themſelues (when they ſee the blame of any thing that falles out ill muſt light vpon themſelues) haue no other ſhift but to beare it out wel, and to make the leaſt of it, for as wee ſee when ſometimes a fault is committed, and before it be knowne who is to blame, much adoe is made of it, but after if it appeare to be done by a ſonne, or by a wife, or by a neere friend, then it is light made of. So much more whē a man muſt take it vpō himſelfe. And therefore it is

commonly ſeene that women that marrie husbands of their owne chooſing againſt their friends cõſents, if they be neuer ſo ill vſed, yet you ſhall ſeldome ſee them complaine, but to ſet a good face on it.

9. *Quod opera & virtute noſtra partum eſt maius bonum; quod ab alieno beneficio, vel ab indulgentia fortunæ delatum eſt minus bonum.*

THe reaſons are firſt the future hope, becauſe in the fauours of others or the good windes of fortune, we haue no ſtate or certainty in our endeuours or abilities

we

we haue. So as when they haue purchaſed vs one good fortune, we haue them as ready and better edged and inured to procure another.

The formes be, *you haue wonne this by play, you haue not onely the water, but you haue the receit, you can make it againe if it be loſt, &c.*

Next, becauſe theſe properties which we inioy by the benefite of others, carry with them an obligation, which ſeemeth a kinde of burthen, whereas the other whiche deriue from our ſelues, are like the freeſt patents *abſque aliquo inde reddendo*, and if they proceede from fortune or prouidence, yet they ſeeme to touch vs ſecretly with the reuerence

of

of the diuine powers whoſe fauours we taſte, and therefore worke a kinde of religious feare and reſtraint, whereas in the other kinde, that come to paſſe which the Prophet ſpeaketh, *Lætantur & exultant, immolant plagis ſuis, & ſacrificant reti ſuo.*

Thirdly, becauſe that which commeth vnto vs without our owne virtue, yeeldeth not that commendation and reputation; for actions of great felicitie may draw wõder, but praiſe-leſſe, as *Cicero* ſaid to *Cæſar*: *Quæ miremur habemus, quæ laudemus expectamus.*

Fourthly, becauſe the purchaſes of our owne induſtrie are ioyned commonly with labour

labour & ſtrife which giues an edge and appetite, and makes the fruition of our deſire more pleaſant, *Suauis cibus a venatu.*

On the other ſide there bee fowre counter colours to this colour rather then reprehenſions, becauſe they be as large as the colour it ſelfe, firſt becauſe felicity ſeemeth to be a character of the fauour and loue of the diuine powers, and accordingly worketh both confidence in our ſelues and reſpect & authoritie from others. And this felicitie extendeth to many caſuall things, whereunto the care or vertue of man cannot extende, and therefore ſeemeth to bee a larger

a larger good, as when *Cæsar* saide to the sayler, *Cæsarem portas et fortunam eius*, if hee had saide, *et virtutem eius*, it had beene small comfort against a tempest otherwise then if it might seeme vpon merite to induce fortune.

Next, whatsoeuer is done by vertue and industrie, seemes to be done by a kind of habite and arte, and therefore open to be imitated and followed, whereas felicitie is imitable: So wee generally see, that thinges of nature seeme more excellent then thinges of arte, because they bee imitable, for *quod imitabile est potentia quadam vulgatum est.*

Thirdly,

Thirdly, felicitie commendeth thoſe things which commeth without our owne labour, for they ſeeme giftes, and the other ſeemes penyworthes: wherupon *Plutarch* ſaith elegantly of the acts of *Timoleon*, who was ſo fortunate, compared with the acts of *Ageſilaus* and *Epaminondas*, *That they were like Homers verſes they ranne ſo eaſily and ſo well*, and therefore it is the worde we giue vnto poeſie, terming it a happy vain, becauſe facilitie ſeemeth euer to come from happineſſe.

Fourthly, this ſame *præter ſpem, vel præter expectatum*, doeth increaſe the price and pleaſure of many things, and this

this cannot bee incident to thoſe thinges that proceede from our owne care, and compaſſe.

10 *Gradus priuationis maior videtur quàm gradus diminutionis, & rurſus gradus inceptionis maior videtur quàm gradus incrementi.*

IT is a poſition in the Mathematiques, that there is no proportion between ſomewhat and nothing, therefore the degree of nullitie and quidditie or act, ſeemeth larger then the degrees of increaſe and decreaſe, as to a monoculos it is more to looſe one eye, then

then to a man that hath two eyes. So if one haue loſt diuers children, it is more grief to him to looſe the laſt then all the reſt, becauſe he is *ſpes gregis*. And therefore *Sybilla* when ſhe brought her three books, and had burned two, did double the whole price of both the other, becauſe the burning of that had been *gradus priuationis*, and not *diminutionis*. This colour is reprehended firſt in thoſe thinges, the vſe and ſeruice whereof reſteth in ſufficiencie, competencie, or determinate quantitie, as if a man bee to paye one hundreth pounds vpon a penaltie, it is more for him to want xii. pence, then after that xii.

pence

pence ſuppoſed to bee wanting, to want ten ſhillinges more: So the decay of a mans eſtate ſeems to be moſt touched in the degree when hee firſt growes behinde, more then afterwards when hee proues nothing worth. And hereof the common formes are, *Sera in fundo parſimonia*, and as good neuer awhit, as neuer the better, &c. It is reprehended alſo in reſpecte of that notion, *Corruptio vnius, generatio alterius*, ſo that *gradus priuationis*, is many times leſſe matter, becauſe it giues the cauſe, and motiue to ſome new courſe. As when *Demoſthenes* reprehended the people for harkning to the conditions

ditions offered by king Phillip, being not honorable nor equal, he ſaith they were but elements of their ſloth and weaknes, which if they were taken away, neceſsitie would teach them ſtronger reſolutions: So Doctor *Hector* was wont to ſay to the dames of London, whē they complained they were they coulde not tell howe, but yet they could not endure to take any medicine, he wold tel them, Their way was onely to bee ſicke, for then they woulde bee glad to take any medicine.

Thirdly, this colour may bee reprehended, in reſpecte that the degree of decreaſe is more ſenſitiue, then the degree

gree of priuation, for in the minde of man, *gradus diminutionis* may worke a wauering between hope and fear, and so keep the mind in suspence from setling and accommodating in patience,& resolution, hereof the common fourmes are, *Better eye out then alwaies ake*, make or marre, &c.

For the seconde braunch of this colour,it depends vpon the same generall reason: hence grewe the common place of extolling the beginning of euery thing, *Dimidium qui bene cœpit habet.* This made the Astrologers so idle as to iudge of a mans nature & destiny by the constellatiō of the moment of his nativity

tiuity, or conceptiō. This colour is reprehended, becauſe many inceptions are but as *Epicurus* termeth them, *tentamenta*, that is, imperfect offers, and eſſaies, which vaniſh and come to no ſubſtance without any iteration, ſo as in ſuch caſes the ſecond degree ſeems the worthieſt, as the body-horſe in the Cart, that draweth more thē the fore-horſe, hereof the common fourmes are, *The ſecond blow makes the fray*, *The ſeconde worde makes the bargaine*, *Alter principium dedit, alter modum abſtulit*, *&c.* Another reprehenſion of this colour is in reſpecte of defatigation, which makes perſeuerance of greater dignity

nitie then inception, for chaunce or instinct of nature may cause inception, but setled affection or iudgement maketh the continuance.

Thirdly, this colour is reprehended in such thinges which haue a naturall course, and inclination contrary to an inception. So that the inception is continually euacuated and gets no start, but there behoueth *perpetua inceptio*, as in the common tourme. *Non progredi, est regredi, Qui non proficit, deficit*, Running against the hill: Rowing against the streame, &c. For if it bee with the streame or with the hill, then the degree of inception

on is more then all the reſt.

Fourthly, this colour is to be vnderſtood of *gradus inceptionis à potentia, ad actum comparatus, cum gradu ab actu ad incrementum:* For otherwiſe, *maior videtur gradus ab impotentia ad potentiam, quàm a potentia ad actum.*

FINIS.

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